Troubled brewed just outside the home of the Interim Party Chairman
of APRC, Fabakary Tombong Jatta, when a large number of UDP supporters
stood outside threatening to attack him and other APRC supporters on
Sunday the 13th May, 2018, a day after the elections were declared by
the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC).
All in their usual yellow dressing, the UDP supporters were seen
standing at the main gate of his residence chanting unpleasant songs.
It was observed that 16 PIU officials dressed in their uniform, with
helmet and tear gas as well as guns prevented the crowd from surging
forward.
It all started when a large crowd of UDP supporters chanted
unpleasant remarks as they passed Mr Jatta’s home, where APRC supporters
were gathered. This led to stone throwing and eventually the UDP
supporters stayed just outside the home threatening to attack. The PIU
personnel could be seen calming the APRC supporters not to retaliate and
they remained calm.
By Yankuba Jallow and Mustapha Jallow
Foroyaa Newspaper, May 14th, 2018
Monday, May 14, 2018
Congo-Brazzaville: Background on militia groups
NAIROBI, 17 February (IRIN) - An
estimated 200,000 residents of southern Brazzaville and an undetermined
number of people in Pool and southern regions have been displaced since
December 1998 as a result of the latest conflict involving militia groups
and government forces. The Congolese people, who had not yet recovered
from the devastating 1997 civil war, are now facing a new and potentially
more serious crisis, humanitarian sources say.
Insecurity linked to armed groups allied to Congo's key political figures has continued sporadically since the end of the 1997 war. Without a resolution to the militia phenomenon, regional analysts say it is difficult to foresee an end to the instability plaguing the country. The potential for a wider and more explosive conflict would persist even if government forces succeeded in gaining control of the security situation in the immediate term, they say.
The militia groups were created to serve as the private armies of the country's three main political leaders. Militia men are drawn mainly from the home areas of the respective leaders, a trend which has resulted in sharp cleavages between regional groups based on ethnic or regional lines.
"The politics of Congo-Brazzaville are triangular, representing three different parts of the country. Two sides of the triangle become aligned against the third, and those alliances are constantly shifting," one analyst told IRIN.
The level of discipline among the militia has varied and some have been accused of serious human rights abuses against unarmed civilian populations, further contributing to growing divisions and feelings of resentment.
The entrenchment of a militia culture in Congo-Brazzaville has been fuelled by several factors, including worsening socio-economic conditions, widespread unemployment and lack of opportunity, a sense of hopelessness, the legacy of the 1993/4 and 1997 civil wars, the pervasiveness of and easy access to weapons and instability in neighbouring countries.
Agreements reached after the 1993/4 civil war to disarm or dismantle the militia groups, including one initiated under UNESCO's Culture of Peace programme, were never implemented. The latest disarmament attempt, started by President Denis Sassou-Nguesso in December 1997, resulted in violent clashes. The militia are reluctant to relinquish their weapons because they serve as a source of power and revenue to them, observers note.
The following is a brief description of the main militia or armed groups now operating in the country:
THE NINJA MILITIA
The Ninja are allied to Bernard Kolelas, who was former president Pascal Lissouba's last prime minister and mayor of Brazzaville until Lissouba was defeated by Sassou's forces in the June-October 1997 civil war. Kolelas remained neutral through most of the war and served as a mediator in the early part of the conflict. However, he later threw in his Ninja militia on the side of Lissouba in an unsuccessful joint attempt to defeat Sassou's forces. The Ninja then retreated into Kolelas' home region of Pool, which surrounds Brazzaville. The security situation in the Pool region has remained uncertain since then, with clashes between government forces and the Ninja intensifying in late September 1998.
In mid-December 1998, Ninja members were reported to have "infiltrated" the southern Brazzaville districts of Bacongo and Makelekele, which are considered to be Kolelas' strongholds (and which were relatively untouched and served as safe havens for displaced persons during the 1997 war). Three days of heavy weapons fire and shelling of the two districts by government forces succeeded in driving out the Ninja from the districts, but a new incursion by Ninja took place in the Kinsoundi area of Brazzaville on 21-22 January, media reports said. Kolelas, the leader of the Mouvement congolais pour la democratie et le developpement integral (MCDDI), is now living in exile in Washington.
THE COBRA MILITIA
Sassou, who had been president since 1979, lost to Lissouba in the country's first multi-party elections in 1992. Sassou's and Kolelas' militia groups were allied against Lissouba during the country's first civil war in 1993/4. That conflict followed controversial 1993 parliamentary elections in which both the MCDDI and Sassou's socialist Parti congolais du travail (PCT) alleged voting irregularities. Although a compromise was reached the following year, the 1993/94 conflict militarized the Congo's political culture, with the Cobra and the Ninja emerging from the PCT and the MCDDI, respectively. Sassou's Cobra militia, supported by Angolan troops, defeated Lissouba' s forces in the 1997 war.
The Cobra members are drawn from Sassou's sparsely-populated northern Congo. Since Sassou's return to power, it has been difficult to make a clear distinction between the Cobra and the regular army. Human rights groups have accused ill-disciplined Cobra militia of rape, arbitrary killings and other abuses against civilians. The number of Cobras is estimated by 'L'Autre Afrique' magazine at 8,000. While Sassou has integrated some into the regular army, many Cobras not selected for integration have retained their weapons and resorted to banditry and looting. Recent reports indicate a factionalism within the ranks of the Cobra.
THE COCOYE MILITIA
Lissouba built up his own militia when his political opponents created the Ninja and the Cobra. Since the end of the 1997 war, his Cocoye militia, also called Zulus, have remained active in the southwestern regions of Niari, Bouenza and Lekoumou (known collectively as Nibolek). In April 1998, Cocoye militia took over the Moukoukoulou hydro-electric dam near Mouyondzi, cutting off electricity to much of southern Congo including the economic capital of Pointe-Noire for weeks. The crisis was resolved following an agreement between the Cocoye and a government delegation.
More recently, Cocoye militia were reported to have at least temporarily gained control of several towns in the south, including Nkayi, Sibiti, Mouyondzi and Loudima. Electricity in Pointe-Noire was again cut off in January 1999 when Cocoye militia took control of a power station, media reports said. An attack on Dolisie took place in late January and fighting was reported to be continuing in the area. Lissouba, leader of the Union panafricaine pour la democratie sociale (UPADS), is now living in exile in London. The Cocoye and the Ninja have recently become formally allied in the Mouvement National pour la Liberation du Congo (MNLC).
OTHER FORCES
The regular army has traditionally been led by officers mainly from northern Congo. A portion of the army reportedly remained sympathetic to Sassou after his defeat by Lissouba in the 1992 elections. Since his return to power, Sassou's control over the army has, however, been tenuous. One of the problems has been irregular payment of soldiers' salaries.
The army is supported by Angolan troops, who have remained in the country since helping Sassou win the 1997 war. Analysts estimate their current number at 1,500. 'La Semaine Africaine' newspaper recently quoted an Angolan officer in Brazzaville as saying Angolan troops would stay in the country as part of efforts to combat the alleged cooperation between the rebel movements seeking to topple the governments of Angola, DRC and Congo-Brazzaville.
UNHCR on Friday said it had confirmed that some Rwandans who had been refugees in Congo-Brazzaville had joined the latest fighting in the country. It said 300-400 Rwandans from northern sites and "several hundred men" from the Kintele refugee camp near Brazzaville had been armed and deployed by the Congolese armed forces. Thousands of Rwandan refugees arrived in the country in May 1997 after fleeing their refugee camps in eastern DRC. Rwandan elements were reported to have participated on both sides of the conflict during the 1997 war in Brazzaville.
Opposition groups have said other foreign forces, including Cubans, are supporting Sassou, a claim denied by the government. The government, meanwhile, has alleged that Angolan UNITA rebels are supporting the Ninja, a claim denied by the opposition.
IRIN
February 17th, 1999
Insecurity linked to armed groups allied to Congo's key political figures has continued sporadically since the end of the 1997 war. Without a resolution to the militia phenomenon, regional analysts say it is difficult to foresee an end to the instability plaguing the country. The potential for a wider and more explosive conflict would persist even if government forces succeeded in gaining control of the security situation in the immediate term, they say.
The militia groups were created to serve as the private armies of the country's three main political leaders. Militia men are drawn mainly from the home areas of the respective leaders, a trend which has resulted in sharp cleavages between regional groups based on ethnic or regional lines.
"The politics of Congo-Brazzaville are triangular, representing three different parts of the country. Two sides of the triangle become aligned against the third, and those alliances are constantly shifting," one analyst told IRIN.
The level of discipline among the militia has varied and some have been accused of serious human rights abuses against unarmed civilian populations, further contributing to growing divisions and feelings of resentment.
The entrenchment of a militia culture in Congo-Brazzaville has been fuelled by several factors, including worsening socio-economic conditions, widespread unemployment and lack of opportunity, a sense of hopelessness, the legacy of the 1993/4 and 1997 civil wars, the pervasiveness of and easy access to weapons and instability in neighbouring countries.
Agreements reached after the 1993/4 civil war to disarm or dismantle the militia groups, including one initiated under UNESCO's Culture of Peace programme, were never implemented. The latest disarmament attempt, started by President Denis Sassou-Nguesso in December 1997, resulted in violent clashes. The militia are reluctant to relinquish their weapons because they serve as a source of power and revenue to them, observers note.
The following is a brief description of the main militia or armed groups now operating in the country:
THE NINJA MILITIA
The Ninja are allied to Bernard Kolelas, who was former president Pascal Lissouba's last prime minister and mayor of Brazzaville until Lissouba was defeated by Sassou's forces in the June-October 1997 civil war. Kolelas remained neutral through most of the war and served as a mediator in the early part of the conflict. However, he later threw in his Ninja militia on the side of Lissouba in an unsuccessful joint attempt to defeat Sassou's forces. The Ninja then retreated into Kolelas' home region of Pool, which surrounds Brazzaville. The security situation in the Pool region has remained uncertain since then, with clashes between government forces and the Ninja intensifying in late September 1998.
In mid-December 1998, Ninja members were reported to have "infiltrated" the southern Brazzaville districts of Bacongo and Makelekele, which are considered to be Kolelas' strongholds (and which were relatively untouched and served as safe havens for displaced persons during the 1997 war). Three days of heavy weapons fire and shelling of the two districts by government forces succeeded in driving out the Ninja from the districts, but a new incursion by Ninja took place in the Kinsoundi area of Brazzaville on 21-22 January, media reports said. Kolelas, the leader of the Mouvement congolais pour la democratie et le developpement integral (MCDDI), is now living in exile in Washington.
THE COBRA MILITIA
Sassou, who had been president since 1979, lost to Lissouba in the country's first multi-party elections in 1992. Sassou's and Kolelas' militia groups were allied against Lissouba during the country's first civil war in 1993/4. That conflict followed controversial 1993 parliamentary elections in which both the MCDDI and Sassou's socialist Parti congolais du travail (PCT) alleged voting irregularities. Although a compromise was reached the following year, the 1993/94 conflict militarized the Congo's political culture, with the Cobra and the Ninja emerging from the PCT and the MCDDI, respectively. Sassou's Cobra militia, supported by Angolan troops, defeated Lissouba' s forces in the 1997 war.
The Cobra members are drawn from Sassou's sparsely-populated northern Congo. Since Sassou's return to power, it has been difficult to make a clear distinction between the Cobra and the regular army. Human rights groups have accused ill-disciplined Cobra militia of rape, arbitrary killings and other abuses against civilians. The number of Cobras is estimated by 'L'Autre Afrique' magazine at 8,000. While Sassou has integrated some into the regular army, many Cobras not selected for integration have retained their weapons and resorted to banditry and looting. Recent reports indicate a factionalism within the ranks of the Cobra.
THE COCOYE MILITIA
Lissouba built up his own militia when his political opponents created the Ninja and the Cobra. Since the end of the 1997 war, his Cocoye militia, also called Zulus, have remained active in the southwestern regions of Niari, Bouenza and Lekoumou (known collectively as Nibolek). In April 1998, Cocoye militia took over the Moukoukoulou hydro-electric dam near Mouyondzi, cutting off electricity to much of southern Congo including the economic capital of Pointe-Noire for weeks. The crisis was resolved following an agreement between the Cocoye and a government delegation.
More recently, Cocoye militia were reported to have at least temporarily gained control of several towns in the south, including Nkayi, Sibiti, Mouyondzi and Loudima. Electricity in Pointe-Noire was again cut off in January 1999 when Cocoye militia took control of a power station, media reports said. An attack on Dolisie took place in late January and fighting was reported to be continuing in the area. Lissouba, leader of the Union panafricaine pour la democratie sociale (UPADS), is now living in exile in London. The Cocoye and the Ninja have recently become formally allied in the Mouvement National pour la Liberation du Congo (MNLC).
OTHER FORCES
The regular army has traditionally been led by officers mainly from northern Congo. A portion of the army reportedly remained sympathetic to Sassou after his defeat by Lissouba in the 1992 elections. Since his return to power, Sassou's control over the army has, however, been tenuous. One of the problems has been irregular payment of soldiers' salaries.
The army is supported by Angolan troops, who have remained in the country since helping Sassou win the 1997 war. Analysts estimate their current number at 1,500. 'La Semaine Africaine' newspaper recently quoted an Angolan officer in Brazzaville as saying Angolan troops would stay in the country as part of efforts to combat the alleged cooperation between the rebel movements seeking to topple the governments of Angola, DRC and Congo-Brazzaville.
UNHCR on Friday said it had confirmed that some Rwandans who had been refugees in Congo-Brazzaville had joined the latest fighting in the country. It said 300-400 Rwandans from northern sites and "several hundred men" from the Kintele refugee camp near Brazzaville had been armed and deployed by the Congolese armed forces. Thousands of Rwandan refugees arrived in the country in May 1997 after fleeing their refugee camps in eastern DRC. Rwandan elements were reported to have participated on both sides of the conflict during the 1997 war in Brazzaville.
Opposition groups have said other foreign forces, including Cubans, are supporting Sassou, a claim denied by the government. The government, meanwhile, has alleged that Angolan UNITA rebels are supporting the Ninja, a claim denied by the opposition.
IRIN
February 17th, 1999
President Sassou Nguesso’s Vs Ninja Militia in the Pool region.
Over the past two weeks, the government of the Republic of Congo has
been engaging in a military campaign against its own civilians.
According to reports, troops and armoured tanks have been dispatched to
the south eastern Pool region. Helicopters there have dropped several
bombs on residential areas leading to an unconfirmed number of deaths
and widespread destruction. And dozens of people have been arrested and
tortured.
This crackdown comes just weeks after the 20 March elections in which President Denis Sassou Nguesso, who has been in power for all but five years since 1979, secured yet another term in office. There were widespread claims that the polls were marred by fraud, and on 4 April, a group of young men set fire to the government’s administrative headquarters in Makélékélé, one of the capital Brazzaville’s nine arrondissements.
The government immediately called the assault a “terrorist attack” and set upon the brutal offensive that still shows no signs of abating. The government justified its response by pointing the finger of blame for the fire on the so-called Ninja rebels, a group has not existed for nearly ten years.
The Makélékélé fire
Brazzaville’s political geography mirrors that of the country as a whole: northerners typically live in the city’s northern neighbourhoods while southerners mostly live in its southern ones. This stratification largely harks back to the 1997 civil war in which northerners generally supported Sassou Nguesso and his Cobra militia, while southerners mostly supported then-President Pascal Lissouba.
The war ended with Sassou Nguesso returning to power after which he authorised a three-day pillage of Makélékélé, one of Brazzaville’s southern neighbourhoods, partly to compensate his Cobra militia and partly to intimidate southerners into submission. By December 1997, Makélékélé was deserted, its onetime residents killed or hiding in the forests.
To govern this neighbourhood, Sassou Nguesso appointed Maurice Maurel Kihounzou, who was implicated in the pillage. The new administrator-mayor described his responsibilities, saying: “I went to war for Sassou Nguesso. This is my compensation. Don’t expect anything from me.” Kihounzou has served in this position ever since and the 4 April fire targeted his office.
Within hours of the attack, the government blamed the Ninja militia. This was a group formed in 1993 as the bodyguard for Brazzaville’s then-mayor Bernard Kolélas. The Ninjas briefly fought against Sassou Nguesso’s Cobras in 1997, but amidst Sassou Nguesso’s attacks on the southern population, the militia evolved into a self-defence force for the Pool region.
By 2007, however, the Ninja militia had been thoroughly disbanded, following the decision of its leader Frédéric Bintsangou (aka Pastor Ntoumi) to accept a ceremonial post in government.
This means that today there is no Ninja militia. Ntoumi has spent the past decade on a ranch in Soumouna, Pool. He has no political aspirations, no constituency, and no weapons cache. And flush with oil revenue, Sassou Nguesso has enjoyed a monopoly on violence for at least 10 years.
Sassou Nguesso blamed the Makélékélé fire on a rebel group that does not exist.
The lost Congolese Spring
Back in September 2015, when Sassou Nguesso announced a constitutional referendum that would abolish certain restrictions to allow him to run for office again, the opposition believed that mass protests would force him to abandon his “constitutional coup d’état”.
Five days after the announcement, some 30,000 citizens protested in Brazzaville, easily the largest demonstration since Sassou Nguesso’s return to power in 1997. Protests continued until the referendum on 25 October. Sassou Nguesso claimed victory in the vote, but the opposition knew it still had a final chance to force him from power: the 20 March presidential election.
The opposition was disappointed in these polls too, however, and the new constitution grants Sassou Nguesso another five-year mandate, renewable twice. This means that he could, in principle, retain power through to 2031. For the vast majority of Congolese citizens, this prospect is crushing. Though Congo-Brazzaville has long ranked among Africa’s leading oil producers, some 60% of its citizens subsist on less than $2/day.
With the time for action fading, the Makélékélé fire was a final attempt to spark a revolution.
The crackdown
In response to the fire, the Sassou Nguesso government on 5 April launched a military campaign against the Pool region. It dispatched ground troops, tanks, and helicopters fitted with missiles. The official goal is to target the Ninja militia, but with no such group in existence, the government’s bombs kill only civilians.
One opposition leader described the operation: “These are targeted strikes. What are they targeting? Civilians. It’s terrible. What is happening in Pool is that we are busy destroying a whole people, it’s a genocide. When you know how densely populated these areas are, you know they are bombarding to decimate all the way to mongrels and cockroaches. They do so to ensure that they kill everyone, that their genocide is achieved.”
Since the government has denied humanitarian organisations access to Pool, the number of fatalities is unclear. Observers put the death toll in the hundreds. Many have sought refuge in the forests, while residents of Makélékélé have fled to Brazzaville’s northern neighbourhoods, where they calculate they will be safe amongst Sassou Nguesso’s few remaining supporters. Some have fled to the northern regions of Plateaux, Sangha, and Likouala.
The government’s military campaign against Pool is a signal to the opposition: acquiesce or be killed. The government has even made this threat explicit on social media. On 8 April it released a video entitled La paix ne va pas s’arrêter, or “peace will not end,” a play on Sassou Nguesso’s campaign slogan. In it, the narrator reminds viewers that “there is only one man who can guarantee peace, security, and stability”. The government repeated the threat in a series of videos released last week.
What next?
As the military attacked the Pool region, the police have arrested and tortured dozens of citizens. To attract attention to the unfolding humanitarian crisis, the leading opposition coalition, FROCAD-IDC, attempted another protest, this one on 15 April, in Brazzaville, a day before Sassou Nguesso’s inauguration.
In response, the government placed FROCAD-IDC’s president, Claudine Munari, under house arrest. Other opposition leaders — including Charles Zacharie Bowao, André Okombi Salissa, Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko, and Guy Brice Parfait Kolélas – remain under house arrest as well. The 15 April protest was cancelled.
Persuaded that Sassou Nguesso will employ violence to retain power, most citizens have relinquished hope of a Congolese Spring. Opposition leaders have not, but if change comes, they increasingly believe it will emanate from Western pressure rather than Brazzaville protests. Accordingly, opposition leaders are currently waging a lobbying campaign in Western capitals.
On 15 April a group of Congolese citizens and concerned “Friends of Congo” visited the US House of Representatives, National Endowment for Democracy, and Voice of America. Days earlier, after a series of interviews with French media outlets, they released an open letter to President François Hollande in Le Monde. The Congolese government responded by announcing it would arrest opposition leader Bowao for “disturbing public order”.
As the opposition looks to Western capitals, Sassou Nguesso has gone in the opposite direction and is keen to broadcast this. Days before the inauguration, the government released a list of world leaders who had “congratulated” Sassou Nguesso for his “electoral victory”. The list is short and features Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, Paul Biya, José Eduardo dos Santos, Paul Kagame, Idriss Déby, Ali Bongo Ondimba, and Joseph Kabila, as well as a handful of other African presidents who have sought Sassou Nguesso’s financial support for electoral campaigns. By casting his lot so publicly, Sassou Nguesso is again signalling to Congolese citizens: He will not be bound by human rights norms encouraged by Western governments.
The central question for the coming months is this: Will opposition lobbying secure some intervention from the international community that fundamentally undercuts Sassou Nguesso’s ability to generate revenue and purchase political support? This question is yet to be answered, but if an ongoing aerial campaign against civilians does not compel Western intervention, very likely nothing will.
April 19th, 2016, Africanarguements.org
Brett L. Carter is a fellow at the Centre for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University. As of August 2016, he will be an Assistant Professor at the School of International Relations, University of Southern California.
This crackdown comes just weeks after the 20 March elections in which President Denis Sassou Nguesso, who has been in power for all but five years since 1979, secured yet another term in office. There were widespread claims that the polls were marred by fraud, and on 4 April, a group of young men set fire to the government’s administrative headquarters in Makélékélé, one of the capital Brazzaville’s nine arrondissements.
The government immediately called the assault a “terrorist attack” and set upon the brutal offensive that still shows no signs of abating. The government justified its response by pointing the finger of blame for the fire on the so-called Ninja rebels, a group has not existed for nearly ten years.
The Makélékélé fire
Brazzaville’s political geography mirrors that of the country as a whole: northerners typically live in the city’s northern neighbourhoods while southerners mostly live in its southern ones. This stratification largely harks back to the 1997 civil war in which northerners generally supported Sassou Nguesso and his Cobra militia, while southerners mostly supported then-President Pascal Lissouba.
The war ended with Sassou Nguesso returning to power after which he authorised a three-day pillage of Makélékélé, one of Brazzaville’s southern neighbourhoods, partly to compensate his Cobra militia and partly to intimidate southerners into submission. By December 1997, Makélékélé was deserted, its onetime residents killed or hiding in the forests.
To govern this neighbourhood, Sassou Nguesso appointed Maurice Maurel Kihounzou, who was implicated in the pillage. The new administrator-mayor described his responsibilities, saying: “I went to war for Sassou Nguesso. This is my compensation. Don’t expect anything from me.” Kihounzou has served in this position ever since and the 4 April fire targeted his office.
Within hours of the attack, the government blamed the Ninja militia. This was a group formed in 1993 as the bodyguard for Brazzaville’s then-mayor Bernard Kolélas. The Ninjas briefly fought against Sassou Nguesso’s Cobras in 1997, but amidst Sassou Nguesso’s attacks on the southern population, the militia evolved into a self-defence force for the Pool region.
By 2007, however, the Ninja militia had been thoroughly disbanded, following the decision of its leader Frédéric Bintsangou (aka Pastor Ntoumi) to accept a ceremonial post in government.
This means that today there is no Ninja militia. Ntoumi has spent the past decade on a ranch in Soumouna, Pool. He has no political aspirations, no constituency, and no weapons cache. And flush with oil revenue, Sassou Nguesso has enjoyed a monopoly on violence for at least 10 years.
Sassou Nguesso blamed the Makélékélé fire on a rebel group that does not exist.
The lost Congolese Spring
Back in September 2015, when Sassou Nguesso announced a constitutional referendum that would abolish certain restrictions to allow him to run for office again, the opposition believed that mass protests would force him to abandon his “constitutional coup d’état”.
Five days after the announcement, some 30,000 citizens protested in Brazzaville, easily the largest demonstration since Sassou Nguesso’s return to power in 1997. Protests continued until the referendum on 25 October. Sassou Nguesso claimed victory in the vote, but the opposition knew it still had a final chance to force him from power: the 20 March presidential election.
The opposition was disappointed in these polls too, however, and the new constitution grants Sassou Nguesso another five-year mandate, renewable twice. This means that he could, in principle, retain power through to 2031. For the vast majority of Congolese citizens, this prospect is crushing. Though Congo-Brazzaville has long ranked among Africa’s leading oil producers, some 60% of its citizens subsist on less than $2/day.
With the time for action fading, the Makélékélé fire was a final attempt to spark a revolution.
The crackdown
In response to the fire, the Sassou Nguesso government on 5 April launched a military campaign against the Pool region. It dispatched ground troops, tanks, and helicopters fitted with missiles. The official goal is to target the Ninja militia, but with no such group in existence, the government’s bombs kill only civilians.
One opposition leader described the operation: “These are targeted strikes. What are they targeting? Civilians. It’s terrible. What is happening in Pool is that we are busy destroying a whole people, it’s a genocide. When you know how densely populated these areas are, you know they are bombarding to decimate all the way to mongrels and cockroaches. They do so to ensure that they kill everyone, that their genocide is achieved.”
Since the government has denied humanitarian organisations access to Pool, the number of fatalities is unclear. Observers put the death toll in the hundreds. Many have sought refuge in the forests, while residents of Makélékélé have fled to Brazzaville’s northern neighbourhoods, where they calculate they will be safe amongst Sassou Nguesso’s few remaining supporters. Some have fled to the northern regions of Plateaux, Sangha, and Likouala.
The government’s military campaign against Pool is a signal to the opposition: acquiesce or be killed. The government has even made this threat explicit on social media. On 8 April it released a video entitled La paix ne va pas s’arrêter, or “peace will not end,” a play on Sassou Nguesso’s campaign slogan. In it, the narrator reminds viewers that “there is only one man who can guarantee peace, security, and stability”. The government repeated the threat in a series of videos released last week.
What next?
As the military attacked the Pool region, the police have arrested and tortured dozens of citizens. To attract attention to the unfolding humanitarian crisis, the leading opposition coalition, FROCAD-IDC, attempted another protest, this one on 15 April, in Brazzaville, a day before Sassou Nguesso’s inauguration.
In response, the government placed FROCAD-IDC’s president, Claudine Munari, under house arrest. Other opposition leaders — including Charles Zacharie Bowao, André Okombi Salissa, Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko, and Guy Brice Parfait Kolélas – remain under house arrest as well. The 15 April protest was cancelled.
Persuaded that Sassou Nguesso will employ violence to retain power, most citizens have relinquished hope of a Congolese Spring. Opposition leaders have not, but if change comes, they increasingly believe it will emanate from Western pressure rather than Brazzaville protests. Accordingly, opposition leaders are currently waging a lobbying campaign in Western capitals.
On 15 April a group of Congolese citizens and concerned “Friends of Congo” visited the US House of Representatives, National Endowment for Democracy, and Voice of America. Days earlier, after a series of interviews with French media outlets, they released an open letter to President François Hollande in Le Monde. The Congolese government responded by announcing it would arrest opposition leader Bowao for “disturbing public order”.
As the opposition looks to Western capitals, Sassou Nguesso has gone in the opposite direction and is keen to broadcast this. Days before the inauguration, the government released a list of world leaders who had “congratulated” Sassou Nguesso for his “electoral victory”. The list is short and features Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, Paul Biya, José Eduardo dos Santos, Paul Kagame, Idriss Déby, Ali Bongo Ondimba, and Joseph Kabila, as well as a handful of other African presidents who have sought Sassou Nguesso’s financial support for electoral campaigns. By casting his lot so publicly, Sassou Nguesso is again signalling to Congolese citizens: He will not be bound by human rights norms encouraged by Western governments.
The central question for the coming months is this: Will opposition lobbying secure some intervention from the international community that fundamentally undercuts Sassou Nguesso’s ability to generate revenue and purchase political support? This question is yet to be answered, but if an ongoing aerial campaign against civilians does not compel Western intervention, very likely nothing will.
April 19th, 2016, Africanarguements.org
Brett L. Carter is a fellow at the Centre for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University. As of August 2016, he will be an Assistant Professor at the School of International Relations, University of Southern California.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)