Over the past two weeks, the government of the Republic of Congo has
been engaging in a military campaign against its own civilians.
According to reports, troops and armoured tanks have been dispatched to
the south eastern Pool region. Helicopters there have dropped several
bombs on residential areas leading to an unconfirmed number of deaths
and widespread destruction. And dozens of people have been arrested and
tortured.
This crackdown comes just weeks after the 20 March elections in which
President Denis Sassou Nguesso, who has been in power for all but five
years since 1979, secured yet another term in office. There were
widespread claims that the polls were marred by fraud, and on 4 April, a
group of young men set fire to the government’s administrative
headquarters in Makélékélé, one of the capital Brazzaville’s nine arrondissements.
The government immediately called the assault a “terrorist attack”
and set upon the brutal offensive that still shows no signs of abating.
The government justified its response by pointing the finger of blame
for the fire on the so-called Ninja rebels, a group has not existed for
nearly ten years.
The Makélékélé fire
Brazzaville’s political geography mirrors that of the country as a
whole: northerners typically live in the city’s northern neighbourhoods
while southerners mostly live in its southern ones. This stratification
largely harks back to the 1997 civil war in which northerners generally
supported Sassou Nguesso and his Cobra militia, while southerners mostly
supported then-President Pascal Lissouba.
The war ended with Sassou Nguesso returning to power after which he
authorised a three-day pillage of Makélékélé, one of Brazzaville’s
southern neighbourhoods, partly to compensate his Cobra militia and
partly to intimidate southerners into submission. By December 1997,
Makélékélé was deserted, its onetime residents killed or hiding in the
forests.
To govern this neighbourhood, Sassou Nguesso appointed Maurice Maurel
Kihounzou, who was implicated in the pillage. The new
administrator-mayor described his responsibilities, saying: “I went to
war for Sassou Nguesso. This is my compensation. Don’t expect anything
from me.” Kihounzou has served in this position ever since and the 4
April fire targeted his office.
Within hours of the attack, the government blamed the Ninja militia.
This was a group formed in 1993 as the bodyguard for Brazzaville’s
then-mayor Bernard Kolélas. The Ninjas briefly fought against Sassou
Nguesso’s Cobras in 1997, but amidst Sassou Nguesso’s attacks on the
southern population, the militia evolved into a self-defence force for
the Pool region.
By 2007, however, the Ninja militia had been thoroughly disbanded,
following the decision of its leader Frédéric Bintsangou (aka Pastor
Ntoumi) to accept a ceremonial post in government.
This means that today there is no Ninja militia. Ntoumi has spent the
past decade on a ranch in Soumouna, Pool. He has no political
aspirations, no constituency, and no weapons cache. And flush with oil
revenue, Sassou Nguesso has enjoyed a monopoly on violence for at least
10 years.
Sassou Nguesso blamed the Makélékélé fire on a rebel group that does not exist.
The lost Congolese Spring
Back in September 2015, when Sassou Nguesso announced a
constitutional referendum that would abolish certain restrictions to
allow him to run for office again, the opposition believed that mass
protests would force him to abandon his “constitutional coup d’état”.
Five days after the announcement, some 30,000 citizens protested in
Brazzaville, easily the largest demonstration since Sassou Nguesso’s
return to power in 1997. Protests continued until the referendum on 25
October. Sassou Nguesso claimed victory in the vote, but the opposition
knew it still had a final chance to force him from power: the 20 March
presidential election.
The opposition was disappointed in these polls too, however, and the
new constitution grants Sassou Nguesso another five-year mandate,
renewable twice. This means that he could, in principle, retain power
through to 2031. For the vast majority of Congolese citizens, this
prospect is crushing. Though Congo-Brazzaville has long ranked among
Africa’s leading oil producers, some 60% of its citizens subsist on less
than $2/day.
With the time for action fading, the Makélékélé fire was a final attempt to spark a revolution.
The crackdown
In response to the fire, the Sassou Nguesso government on 5 April
launched a military campaign against the Pool region. It dispatched
ground troops, tanks, and helicopters fitted with missiles. The official
goal is to target the Ninja militia, but with no such group in
existence, the government’s bombs kill only civilians.
One opposition leader described the operation: “These are targeted strikes. What are they targeting? Civilians. It’s
terrible. What is happening in Pool is that we are busy destroying a
whole people, it’s a genocide. When you know how densely populated these
areas are, you know they are bombarding to decimate all the way to
mongrels and cockroaches. They do so to ensure that they kill everyone,
that their genocide is achieved.”
Since the government has denied humanitarian organisations access to
Pool, the number of fatalities is unclear. Observers put the death toll
in the hundreds. Many have sought refuge in the forests, while residents
of Makélékélé have fled to Brazzaville’s northern neighbourhoods, where
they calculate they will be safe amongst Sassou Nguesso’s few remaining
supporters. Some have fled to the northern regions of Plateaux, Sangha,
and Likouala.
The government’s military campaign against Pool is a signal to the
opposition: acquiesce or be killed. The government has even made this
threat explicit on social media. On 8 April it released a video entitled
La paix ne va pas s’arrêter,
or “peace will not end,” a play on Sassou Nguesso’s campaign slogan. In
it, the narrator reminds viewers that “there is only one man who can
guarantee peace, security, and stability”. The government repeated the
threat in a series of videos released last week.
What next?
As the military attacked the Pool region, the police have arrested
and tortured dozens of citizens. To attract attention to the unfolding
humanitarian crisis, the leading opposition coalition, FROCAD-IDC,
attempted another protest, this one on 15 April, in Brazzaville, a day
before Sassou Nguesso’s inauguration.
In response, the government placed FROCAD-IDC’s president, Claudine
Munari, under house arrest. Other opposition leaders — including Charles
Zacharie Bowao, André Okombi Salissa, Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko, and Guy
Brice Parfait Kolélas – remain under house arrest as well. The 15 April
protest was cancelled.
Persuaded that Sassou Nguesso will employ violence to retain power,
most citizens have relinquished hope of a Congolese Spring. Opposition
leaders have not, but if change comes, they increasingly believe it will
emanate from Western pressure rather than Brazzaville protests.
Accordingly, opposition leaders are currently waging a lobbying campaign
in Western capitals.
On 15 April a group of Congolese citizens and concerned “Friends of
Congo” visited the US House of Representatives, National Endowment for
Democracy, and Voice of America. Days earlier, after a series of
interviews with French media outlets, they released an open letter to
President François Hollande in Le Monde. The Congolese government responded by announcing it would arrest opposition leader Bowao for “disturbing public order”.
As the opposition looks to Western capitals, Sassou Nguesso has gone
in the opposite direction and is keen to broadcast this. Days before the
inauguration, the government released a list of world leaders who had
“congratulated” Sassou Nguesso for his “electoral victory”. The list is
short and features Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, Paul Biya, José Eduardo
dos Santos, Paul Kagame, Idriss Déby, Ali Bongo Ondimba, and Joseph
Kabila, as well as a handful of other African presidents who have sought
Sassou Nguesso’s financial support for electoral campaigns. By casting
his lot so publicly, Sassou Nguesso is again signalling to Congolese
citizens: He will not be bound by human rights norms encouraged by
Western governments.
The central question for the coming months is this: Will opposition
lobbying secure some intervention from the international community that
fundamentally undercuts Sassou Nguesso’s ability to generate revenue and
purchase political support? This question is yet to be answered, but if
an ongoing aerial campaign against civilians does not compel Western
intervention, very likely nothing will.
April 19th, 2016, Africanarguements.org
Brett L. Carter is a fellow at the Centre for Democracy,
Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University. As of August
2016, he will be an Assistant Professor at the School of International
Relations, University of Southern California.
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