Gambia: GMC youth leader reacts to President’s adviser

Ousman Bah, a youth leader of the Gambia Moral Congress has responded to remarks made by presidential adviser for youth Musa Jeng, who on Tuesday called on their party leader Mai Fatty to be quiet or face exposure.

The full statement reads:

“I have come across a news article in The Standard newspaper edition of Tuesday June 26, 2018 titled, ‘Presidential Adviser Warns Mai To Shut Up Or Else…..’, attributed to President Adama Barrow’s adviser on youth affairs Musa Jeng where he (Musa Jeng) went on a verbal onslaught against Hon Mai Ahmad Fatty, the leader of the Gambia Moral Congress.

Ordinarily, one would not have bothered to react except for the fact that some falsehood should not be allowed to pass just like that. A response is not injudicious since what Mr Jeng said – unfortunately – are tissues of lies presented in a way that may look factual to an unsuspecting public.

First, Musa Jeng condemned Hon Mai Fatty for giving his opinion on the coalition’s three years deal. Musa Jeng must understand that Hon Fatty was in no way criticizing President Adama Barrow when he (Mai Fatty) said he is committed to the three-year coalition agreement and so should President Barrow. Hon Fatty is not against President Barrow to go for five years. But GMC and Fatty’s position is that it’s not proper for the President to publicly declare that he is going for five years without conferring with the coalition leaders first. In fact Mai Fatty is not the first coalition stakeholder to give his opinion on this issue. Vice President Fatoumatta Jallow Tambajang is the first coalition spearhead who said the coalition deal says Barrow should serve for three years. This position is held by others like Omar Jallow and Halifa Sallah.

Musa Jeng, in the interview, said that GMC during the formation of the Coalition, GMC could not even provide the required five delegates requested from the political parties. He said GMC hadonly one woman representing them and it was him and Kebba Singhateh, the first secretary at the Gambian Embassy in Russia, who were helping the woman to get GMC onboard. What baloney! How can a party that furnished the coalition convention with 70 delegates struggle to deliver just five as averred by Musa Jeng.

Meanwhile, Musa Jeng accused Hon Mai Fatty of forcing Yahya Jammeh associates like Muhammed Bazzi on President Barrow for financial gains. It will beat this political harlot to learn that Hon. Fatty never forced Muhammed Bazzi on President Barrow. Bazzi, it’s known, met with Barrow on the night of December 7, 2016 and the person who brought him to Barrow’s house in Yarambamba was Musa Drammeh, Barrow’s current senior adviser on investment. So this statement is not only funny but a clear assault on everything that is truth. It’s a spectacular piece of fiction from a fertile mind with agenda for grave mischief. Hon Fatty never introduced Bazzi to President Barrow. A relationship was already established and Hon Fatty surprisingly met Bazzi in Barrow’s house in Yarambamba.

Still, Musa Jeng made an incendiary charge that during his time as the interior minister Hon. Fatty “misused his powers by ordering security to mount salutes for him as if he is the president…He also used to walk on a red carpet…” That Hon. Fatty abused authority when he was interior minister as alleged by Musa Jeng will never pass the barometer of truth. Hon. Fatty never ordered any security to mount salutes for him. In fact, Gambian security men and women will find this statement laughable.

Additionally, Musa Jeng said government would hold him to account for building a new house while serving as interior minister. Allegations of corruption are serious and should not be made without proof. Hon Fatty did not build any new house while in office. The onus lies with Musa Jeng to provide proof of Hon. Fatty building a new house using state funds. In an event he’s not able to show proof; these statements would then be sheer concoctions coming from an uninformed yet curmudgeonly political nobody.

Yet we are worried about President Barrow. People like Musa Jeng cannot advise themselves, talk less of a president. I’m of a mind to say Musa Jeng doesn’t even know his mandate. How can a presidential adviser on youth matters speak on something that’s for political advisers? It shows this man is out-of-touch with the rudiments of his office. In the interview, he went as far as impliedly telling President Barrow that his government was founded on dishonesty and fraud by stating that he (Musa Jeng) and others used fraudulent means to get delegates for President Barrow.

There is no doubt that Hon. Fatty did a great job as Interior Minister. In fact it’s being said that he’s the best interior minister The Gambia has ever had. Hon. Fatty’s credibility remains fantastic and excellent. For Musa Jeng’s information, Hon. Fatty represents the new hope of a new progressive political era.

In politics, it’s normal for people to differ – sometimes fundamentally – on issues. What is not normal is the use of politics as a means of wrecking relationships. Hon Mai Fatty respects President Barrow and values the relationship between him and the president.”

Freedom Newspaper,  June 28th, 2018

OJ Demands Evidence On Fertiliser Allegation

By: Kebba Mamburay/Mustapha Jallow,
Foroyaa Newspaper; June 19th, 2018
Mr Omar Jallow, Minister of Agriculture yesterday afternoon called for the provision of evidence for the allegation that he is involved in the sale of fertiliser for personal financial gain. He was speaking at a press conference held at his ministry.
Mr Jallow said while he was away on an official mission, it happened that some media published some allegation against him as minister of agriculture in relation to the issue of the expired fertilizers in different stores within the country. He added that in one of the publications, it was written that he signed a contract with a businessman for the sale of the fertilizer for financial gain. He then emphasised that allegation is unfounded, malicious and defamatory. The minister stated categorically that he had never been involved in such a transaction, neither signed a contract, nor knew when the contract was signed and had not known about the contract until long after the contract was signed.
He stated that the process started in 2009 when the fertiliser was imported into the country and found unfit for usage. Some of the people responsible for the importation were arrested and detained, OJ said.
According to him, in 2014, the process to discard this fertiliser was started and from the information he gathered including all the documents provided for media personnel as evidence and proof, due process and diligence were observed and respected.
He said he could not understand how he can be associated with a process that started since 2014 when he was not yet appointed, stressing that he was never contacted or aware of the contract. To clear the doubts of media personnel OJ provided copies of contract letters from GPPA, GGC and other relevant authorities who were involved in this process.
He further pointed out that about eight months ago, ISIS began an investigation regarding the saga and when they came to his office, he told them categorically clear that he was never informed, nor involved in  the whole process of this fertilizer issue which was confirmed to them by his former permanent secretary.
OJ Jallow, minister of agriculture, said he would like to call on the publishers of the allegations raised against him to come forward to provide evidence that he signed this contract for financial gain, or else he will take legal action to resolve the matter.
He went on to say that the courts have to clear or settle this matter even if it will cost him his job, adding that not even the president can convince him to drop this matter so as to settle it out of court.
The Minister then remarked that, with the new dispensation, they thought that all professionals and institutions will live up to expectation and have high ethics but after going through serious and difficult times during the previous regime, they are witnessing people coming again to put them and their families through more stressing and difficult situations.
OJ argued that he could not engage in monetary corruption because if he were greedy we would not have come back to The Gambia because he was working in East Timor he was earning $6,000. He asked why would he leave that place for the Gambia if he has no love for this country?

Two PIU Officers In Custody After The Shooting Of Two Citizens In Faraba

June 19th, 2018,  FatuNetwork.Net

ASP Musa Fatty a young PIU officer and another officer are currently detained at the Serious Crime Unit of The Gambia Police Force for allegedly shooting at enviromental activists during a protest against a sand mining company in Faraba.
Their arrests came after the office of the inspector general of police issued a press statement stating that the office did not authorize the use of fire arms which led to the death of Bakary Kujabi and Ismaila Bah.

Musa Fatty is originally from Banjulnding but currently resides in Busumbala with his wife. He got married according to his friends shortly before Ramadan. Musa joined the Police in mid 2000 after he graduated from Saint Augustine’s High school

It was during one of former President Jammeh’s countrywide tours that Jammeh spotted Musa and commended his role thereby instructing former IGP, Yankuba Sonko to promote him to the rank of Assistant Suprintendant of Police (ASP) with immediate effect, he was a junior officer then. He also served as ordely to former interior minister, Ousman Sonko.
ASP Fatty was trained in Turkey and Egypt. Upon return, he served as officer in charge of VIP protection at the police. He also escorded the April 14 protesters to Janjanbureh prison and is said to have treated them with utmost respect.

Shortly after Barrow became President, ASP Fatty became part of the first batch from the PIU that took over from the state guards. He was later removed because of ‘disgareements’ he had with Security personnel at the Presidency not The Gambian security officers.
The ASP was then moved back to The PIU headquarters in Kanifing as commander where he led many operations including The ‘Occupy Westfield’ the Kanilai protests and Farato. The Faraba incident though was led by one Suprintendant Cham and ASP Fatty and his men were called in for reinforcement after the PIU on the ground communicated that they were overpowered by the villagers of Faraba.
A security source told The Fatu Network that Musa is a very professional officer who is always on hand when situations occur.
‘ I doubt Musa will make sure a decision by himself, he will never shoot at innocent civilians without instructions’
‘They just want to sacrifice Musa, this is why they putting all the blame on him’ Another source said
The Fatu Network has also been informed that ASP Fatty’s pistol with live rounds has gone missing.
Meanwhile, one of the PIU officers at the scene yesterday is said to be in coma.ASP M Fatty

PIU Officers Killed Two, Injured Many At Faraba Village

The Police Intervention Unit (PIU) have reportedly shot live bullets at peaceful demonstrators killing two activists leaving several others with serious injuries on Monday at Faraba Banta Village, Kombo East District.

According to sources the fracas emanated from Julakay Engineering Company that is currently engaged in sand mining operations though the villagers say they were not consulted and felt the operations will have serious impact on their environment.

Bakary Kujabi was reportedly shot on his chest and Ismaila Bah on his neck causing their instant death at the scene. The several injured include Francois Jammeh, Salifu Darboe, Jalang Darboe, Sainey Sonko, Dawda Daffeh, Pa Jammeh (shot on his leg), Buba Sanyang, Masanneh Njie, Sheriffo Touray and Amadou Jang Jawo who was shot on his buttocks is currently in critical condition. Many of them are admitted at the EFST Hospital in Banjul.

“We were not armed,” Mustapha Camara said.

The youth leader also an eyewitness told The Fatu Network that they were talking to the PIU officers posted at the village to ask the truck drivers to return the loaded sand until they received clearance from the National Assembly Select Committee that suspended mining operations at the place.

“While we were talking, two trucks of PIU officers came and fired two shots in the air….then started throwing tear gas…we picked it up and throw it back at them,” Mustapha said.

“They started firing rubber bullets before using live bullets killing our people,” he added.

“I was the first person who came to rescued Bakary Kujabi who was shot on his chest and the bullet passed through his back”

Mustapha explained that the seventeen (17) year old Bakary Kujabi was the only child of his mother.

“We want to know whether the IGP or President Barrow gave the order to fire live bullets at us,” Mustapha retorted.

Suwaibou Sanyang, another eyewitness told The Fatu Network that they heard the PIU officers saying aloud ‘Let us killed them’. He said they were using foul and abusive words.

The angry youths went after the alleged culprits dealing with Julakay Engineering Company. The Chief Bakary Sanyang of Kombo East was not spared, they brought the death bodies to his place and slapped him several times before fleeing away. The house and car belonging to Jung Conteh, former Chief was burnt likewise Jambawuntu Sanyang and Boyo Jarju. They all fled away with the Village Head, Nuha Kujabi, Bakary Saidy and Mamadi Saidy.

The villagers say one of the shooters of Bakary Kujabi was a PIU Officer and his name is Alieu Camara of Brikama New Town.

“I told him on his face that he has killed an innocent person”

The Police Spokesperson, Superintendent David Kujabi was contacted but said he is gathering information about the incident.

The person behind the Julakay Engineering Company is one Ansumana Marenah. He is from Badibu Suwareh Kunda, a close associate of the late Baba Jobe who introduced him to the former President Yahya Jammeh.

Mr Ansumana Marenah commonly known as ‘Julakay’ was a businessman and financiers of the former ruling APRC Party.

Meanwhile, Journalist Pa Modou Bojang, the presenter of Menbekering programme was reportedly arrested and detained at the Brikama Police Station.

By: Lamin Sanyang,  June 18th, 2018

FatuNetwork.net

Tension between UDP and APRC supporters.

Troubled brewed just outside the home of the Interim Party Chairman of APRC, Fabakary Tombong Jatta, when a large number of UDP supporters stood outside threatening to attack him and other APRC supporters on Sunday the 13th May, 2018, a day after the elections were declared by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC).
All in their usual yellow dressing, the UDP supporters were seen standing at the main gate of his residence chanting unpleasant songs.
It was observed that 16 PIU officials dressed in their uniform, with helmet and tear gas as well as guns prevented the crowd from surging forward.

It all started when a large crowd of UDP supporters chanted unpleasant remarks as they passed Mr Jatta’s home, where APRC supporters were gathered. This led to stone throwing and eventually the UDP supporters stayed just outside the home threatening to attack. The PIU personnel could be seen calming the APRC supporters not to retaliate and they remained calm.

By Yankuba Jallow and Mustapha Jallow
Foroyaa Newspaper, May 14th, 2018

Congo-Brazzaville: Background on militia groups

NAIROBI, 17 February (IRIN) - An estimated 200,000 residents of southern Brazzaville and an undetermined number of people in Pool and southern regions have been displaced since December 1998 as a result of the latest conflict involving militia groups and government forces. The Congolese people, who had not yet recovered from the devastating 1997 civil war, are now facing a new and potentially more serious crisis, humanitarian sources say.
Insecurity linked to armed groups allied to Congo's key political figures has continued sporadically since the end of the 1997 war. Without a resolution to the militia phenomenon, regional analysts say it is difficult to foresee an end to the instability plaguing the country. The potential for a wider and more explosive conflict would persist even if government forces succeeded in gaining control of the security situation in the immediate term, they say.
The militia groups were created to serve as the private armies of the country's three main political leaders. Militia men are drawn mainly from the home areas of the respective leaders, a trend which has resulted in sharp cleavages between regional groups based on ethnic or regional lines.
"The politics of Congo-Brazzaville are triangular, representing three different parts of the country. Two sides of the triangle become aligned against the third, and those alliances are constantly shifting," one analyst told IRIN.
The level of discipline among the militia has varied and some have been accused of serious human rights abuses against unarmed civilian populations, further contributing to growing divisions and feelings of resentment.
The entrenchment of a militia culture in Congo-Brazzaville has been fuelled by several factors, including worsening socio-economic conditions, widespread unemployment and lack of opportunity, a sense of hopelessness, the legacy of the 1993/4 and 1997 civil wars, the pervasiveness of and easy access to weapons and instability in neighbouring countries.
Agreements reached after the 1993/4 civil war to disarm or dismantle the militia groups, including one initiated under UNESCO's Culture of Peace programme, were never implemented. The latest disarmament attempt, started by President Denis Sassou-Nguesso in December 1997, resulted in violent clashes. The militia are reluctant to relinquish their weapons because they serve as a source of power and revenue to them, observers note.
The following is a brief description of the main militia or armed groups now operating in the country:
THE NINJA MILITIA
The Ninja are allied to Bernard Kolelas, who was former president Pascal Lissouba's last prime minister and mayor of Brazzaville until Lissouba was defeated by Sassou's forces in the June-October 1997 civil war. Kolelas remained neutral through most of the war and served as a mediator in the early part of the conflict. However, he later threw in his Ninja militia on the side of Lissouba in an unsuccessful joint attempt to defeat Sassou's forces. The Ninja then retreated into Kolelas' home region of Pool, which surrounds Brazzaville. The security situation in the Pool region has remained uncertain since then, with clashes between government forces and the Ninja intensifying in late September 1998.
In mid-December 1998, Ninja members were reported to have "infiltrated" the southern Brazzaville districts of Bacongo and Makelekele, which are considered to be Kolelas' strongholds (and which were relatively untouched and served as safe havens for displaced persons during the 1997 war). Three days of heavy weapons fire and shelling of the two districts by government forces succeeded in driving out the Ninja from the districts, but a new incursion by Ninja took place in the Kinsoundi area of Brazzaville on 21-22 January, media reports said. Kolelas, the leader of the Mouvement congolais pour la democratie et le developpement integral (MCDDI), is now living in exile in Washington.
THE COBRA MILITIA
Sassou, who had been president since 1979, lost to Lissouba in the country's first multi-party elections in 1992. Sassou's and Kolelas' militia groups were allied against Lissouba during the country's first civil war in 1993/4. That conflict followed controversial 1993 parliamentary elections in which both the MCDDI and Sassou's socialist Parti congolais du travail (PCT) alleged voting irregularities. Although a compromise was reached the following year, the 1993/94 conflict militarized the Congo's political culture, with the Cobra and the Ninja emerging from the PCT and the MCDDI, respectively. Sassou's Cobra militia, supported by Angolan troops, defeated Lissouba' s forces in the 1997 war.
The Cobra members are drawn from Sassou's sparsely-populated northern Congo. Since Sassou's return to power, it has been difficult to make a clear distinction between the Cobra and the regular army. Human rights groups have accused ill-disciplined Cobra militia of rape, arbitrary killings and other abuses against civilians. The number of Cobras is estimated by 'L'Autre Afrique' magazine at 8,000. While Sassou has integrated some into the regular army, many Cobras not selected for integration have retained their weapons and resorted to banditry and looting. Recent reports indicate a factionalism within the ranks of the Cobra.
THE COCOYE MILITIA
Lissouba built up his own militia when his political opponents created the Ninja and the Cobra. Since the end of the 1997 war, his Cocoye militia, also called Zulus, have remained active in the southwestern regions of Niari, Bouenza and Lekoumou (known collectively as Nibolek). In April 1998, Cocoye militia took over the Moukoukoulou hydro-electric dam near Mouyondzi, cutting off electricity to much of southern Congo including the economic capital of Pointe-Noire for weeks. The crisis was resolved following an agreement between the Cocoye and a government delegation.
More recently, Cocoye militia were reported to have at least temporarily gained control of several towns in the south, including Nkayi, Sibiti, Mouyondzi and Loudima. Electricity in Pointe-Noire was again cut off in January 1999 when Cocoye militia took control of a power station, media reports said. An attack on Dolisie took place in late January and fighting was reported to be continuing in the area. Lissouba, leader of the Union panafricaine pour la democratie sociale (UPADS), is now living in exile in London. The Cocoye and the Ninja have recently become formally allied in the Mouvement National pour la Liberation du Congo (MNLC).
OTHER FORCES
The regular army has traditionally been led by officers mainly from northern Congo. A portion of the army reportedly remained sympathetic to Sassou after his defeat by Lissouba in the 1992 elections. Since his return to power, Sassou's control over the army has, however, been tenuous. One of the problems has been irregular payment of soldiers' salaries.
The army is supported by Angolan troops, who have remained in the country since helping Sassou win the 1997 war. Analysts estimate their current number at 1,500. 'La Semaine Africaine' newspaper recently quoted an Angolan officer in Brazzaville as saying Angolan troops would stay in the country as part of efforts to combat the alleged cooperation between the rebel movements seeking to topple the governments of Angola, DRC and Congo-Brazzaville.
UNHCR on Friday said it had confirmed that some Rwandans who had been refugees in Congo-Brazzaville had joined the latest fighting in the country. It said 300-400 Rwandans from northern sites and "several hundred men" from the Kintele refugee camp near Brazzaville had been armed and deployed by the Congolese armed forces. Thousands of Rwandan refugees arrived in the country in May 1997 after fleeing their refugee camps in eastern DRC. Rwandan elements were reported to have participated on both sides of the conflict during the 1997 war in Brazzaville.
Opposition groups have said other foreign forces, including Cubans, are supporting Sassou, a claim denied by the government. The government, meanwhile, has alleged that Angolan UNITA rebels are supporting the Ninja, a claim denied by the opposition.

IRIN
February 17th, 1999

President Sassou Nguesso’s Vs Ninja Militia in the Pool region.

Over the past two weeks, the government of the Republic of Congo has been engaging in a military campaign against its own civilians. According to reports, troops and armoured tanks have been dispatched to the south eastern Pool region. Helicopters there have dropped several bombs on residential areas leading to an unconfirmed number of deaths and widespread destruction. And dozens of people have been arrested and tortured.
This crackdown comes just weeks after the 20 March elections in which President Denis Sassou Nguesso, who has been in power for all but five years since 1979, secured yet another term in office. There were widespread claims that the polls were marred by fraud, and on 4 April, a group of young men set fire to the government’s administrative headquarters in Makélékélé, one of the capital Brazzaville’s nine arrondissements.
The government immediately called the assault a “terrorist attack” and set upon the brutal offensive that still shows no signs of abating. The government justified its response by pointing the finger of blame for the fire on the so-called Ninja rebels, a group has not existed for nearly ten years.
The Makélékélé fire
Brazzaville’s political geography mirrors that of the country as a whole: northerners typically live in the city’s northern neighbourhoods while southerners mostly live in its southern ones. This stratification largely harks back to the 1997 civil war in which northerners generally supported Sassou Nguesso and his Cobra militia, while southerners mostly supported then-President Pascal Lissouba.
The war ended with Sassou Nguesso returning to power after which he authorised a three-day pillage of Makélékélé, one of Brazzaville’s southern neighbourhoods, partly to compensate his Cobra militia and partly to intimidate southerners into submission. By December 1997, Makélékélé was deserted, its onetime residents killed or hiding in the forests.
To govern this neighbourhood, Sassou Nguesso appointed Maurice Maurel Kihounzou, who was implicated in the pillage. The new administrator-mayor described his responsibilities, saying: “I went to war for Sassou Nguesso. This is my compensation. Don’t expect anything from me.” Kihounzou has served in this position ever since and the 4 April fire targeted his office.
Within hours of the attack, the government blamed the Ninja militia. This was a group formed in 1993 as the bodyguard for Brazzaville’s then-mayor Bernard Kolélas. The Ninjas briefly fought against Sassou Nguesso’s Cobras in 1997, but amidst Sassou Nguesso’s attacks on the southern population, the militia evolved into a self-defence force for the Pool region.
By 2007, however, the Ninja militia had been thoroughly disbanded, following the decision of its leader Frédéric Bintsangou (aka Pastor Ntoumi) to accept a ceremonial post in government.
This means that today there is no Ninja militia. Ntoumi has spent the past decade on a ranch in Soumouna, Pool. He has no political aspirations, no constituency, and no weapons cache. And flush with oil revenue, Sassou Nguesso has enjoyed a monopoly on violence for at least 10 years.
Sassou Nguesso blamed the Makélékélé fire on a rebel group that does not exist.
The lost Congolese Spring
Back in September 2015, when Sassou Nguesso announced a constitutional referendum that would abolish certain restrictions to allow him to run for office again, the opposition believed that mass protests would force him to abandon his “constitutional coup d’état”.

Five days after the announcement, some 30,000 citizens protested in Brazzaville, easily the largest demonstration since Sassou Nguesso’s return to power in 1997. Protests continued until the referendum on 25 October. Sassou Nguesso claimed victory in the vote, but the opposition knew it still had a final chance to force him from power: the 20 March presidential election.
The opposition was disappointed in these polls too, however, and the new constitution grants Sassou Nguesso another five-year mandate, renewable twice. This means that he could, in principle, retain power through to 2031. For the vast majority of Congolese citizens, this prospect is crushing. Though Congo-Brazzaville has long ranked among Africa’s leading oil producers, some 60% of its citizens subsist on less than $2/day.

With the time for action fading, the Makélékélé fire was a final attempt to spark a revolution.
The crackdown
In response to the fire, the Sassou Nguesso government on 5 April launched a military campaign against the Pool region. It dispatched ground troops, tanks, and helicopters fitted with missiles. The official goal is to target the Ninja militia, but with no such group in existence, the government’s bombs kill only civilians.
One opposition leader described the operation: “These are targeted strikes. What are they targeting? Civilians. It’s terrible. What is happening in Pool is that we are busy destroying a whole people, it’s a genocide. When you know how densely populated these areas are, you know they are bombarding to decimate all the way to mongrels and cockroaches. They do so to ensure that they kill everyone, that their genocide is achieved.”
Since the government has denied humanitarian organisations access to Pool, the number of fatalities is unclear. Observers put the death toll in the hundreds. Many have sought refuge in the forests, while residents of Makélékélé have fled to Brazzaville’s northern neighbourhoods, where they calculate they will be safe amongst Sassou Nguesso’s few remaining supporters. Some have fled to the northern regions of Plateaux, Sangha, and Likouala.
The government’s military campaign against Pool is a signal to the opposition: acquiesce or be killed. The government has even made this threat explicit on social media. On 8 April it released a video entitled La paix ne va pas s’arrêter, or “peace will not end,” a play on Sassou Nguesso’s campaign slogan. In it, the narrator reminds viewers that “there is only one man who can guarantee peace, security, and stability”. The government repeated the threat in a series of videos released last week.
What next?
As the military attacked the Pool region, the police have arrested and tortured dozens of citizens. To attract attention to the unfolding humanitarian crisis, the leading opposition coalition, FROCAD-IDC, attempted another protest, this one on 15 April, in Brazzaville, a day before Sassou Nguesso’s inauguration.
In response, the government placed FROCAD-IDC’s president, Claudine Munari, under house arrest. Other opposition leaders — including Charles Zacharie Bowao, André Okombi Salissa, Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko, and Guy Brice Parfait Kolélas – remain under house arrest as well. The 15 April protest was cancelled.
Persuaded that Sassou Nguesso will employ violence to retain power, most citizens have relinquished hope of a Congolese Spring. Opposition leaders have not, but if change comes, they increasingly believe it will emanate from Western pressure rather than Brazzaville protests. Accordingly, opposition leaders are currently waging a lobbying campaign in Western capitals.
On 15 April a group of Congolese citizens and concerned “Friends of Congo” visited the US House of Representatives, National Endowment for Democracy, and Voice of America. Days earlier, after a series of interviews with French media outlets, they released an open letter to President François Hollande in Le Monde. The Congolese government responded by announcing it would arrest opposition leader Bowao for “disturbing public order”.
As the opposition looks to Western capitals, Sassou Nguesso has gone in the opposite direction and is keen to broadcast this. Days before the inauguration, the government released a list of world leaders who had “congratulated” Sassou Nguesso for his “electoral victory”. The list is short and features Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, Paul Biya, José Eduardo dos Santos, Paul Kagame, Idriss Déby, Ali Bongo Ondimba, and Joseph Kabila, as well as a handful of other African presidents who have sought Sassou Nguesso’s financial support for electoral campaigns. By casting his lot so publicly, Sassou Nguesso is again signalling to Congolese citizens: He will not be bound by human rights norms encouraged by Western governments.
The central question for the coming months is this: Will opposition lobbying secure some intervention from the international community that fundamentally undercuts Sassou Nguesso’s ability to generate revenue and purchase political support? This question is yet to be answered, but if an ongoing aerial campaign against civilians does not compel Western intervention, very likely nothing will.

April 19th, 2016, Africanarguements.org

Brett L. Carter is a fellow at the Centre for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University. As of August 2016, he will be an Assistant Professor at the School of International Relations, University of Southern California.